The article concludes that although the Norwegian IT industry has been lacking in export success the last 30 years, it has been important for the development of the Norwegian economy. Several IT companies have been on the verge of international breakthroughs, but have been stopped by rising costs and guided by national opportunities. The rise of the important oil-sector has been both a hindrance and an opportunity for the Norwegian IT industry. Specialised products for national markets rather than general mass-market products have become the norm for the Norwegian IT industry. This development had to a remarkable degree been associated with continuity in terms of organisations and people. The firms these people and organisations have been attached too, however, have experienced turbulence, bankruptcy and change, making the whole development from 1970 until today a seemingly messy and problematic affair. But this has really been a period of IT industry growth, and in the end the national development is reasonably successful.
Introduction
Although Norway is one of the world's richest nations and consequently a large user of IT equipment and IT solutions, it remains a relatively small producer of IT equipment. 1 Of the four, rich Nordic nations, Norway has the smallest production of IT goods, both in terms of absolute value and in terms of the IT production as percentage of total industrial output. 2 Norwegian imports of IT goods have at the start of this century for some years constituted about three times the value of Norwegian IT exports. In terms of quantitative significance of what may be termed "national IT competence", Norway is the Nordic jumbo. This chapter sets out to shed light on how the Norwegian IT industry has developed and why Norway has become such a comparatively poor IT performer.
It is not because of a late start. Norway was an early starter in what became the IT industry. 3 Already in 1882 a Norwegian maker of telecommunications equipment was started, Elektrisk
Bureau, based on the very early and intense use of telephone in Norway. Elektrisk Bureau also soon had exports and foreign operations at the turn of the last century. 4 Prior to World War II several new electronic companies were started, mostly making different kinds of radios, and gradually a fully-fledged industry formed and developed, to a substantial degree in relationship with Government policies promoting IT production. Both Tandbergs Radiofabrikk and Norsk Data were at times quite successful in foreign markets, and especially Tandberg was well known.
But the success disappeared as time went on, and for the time being Norway is the worst Nordic performer.
The staggering difference in 2007 between Norway and its Nordic neighbours Sweden and
Finland is the absence of any large multinational company in the IT sector. Sweden's Ericsson and Finland's Nokia are not matched by any comparable Norwegian enterprise, and even fellow Nordic IT laggard Denmark has world-famous consumer electronics company Bang & Olufsen to its name. Why is Norway not more successful? Could it be because of lack of competence?
Probably not, but more will be said about that later. There is an argument for the cost-increasing and crowding out effect of the large oil and gas sector in the Norwegian economy since the mid 1970s that has made it difficult for Norwegian export-conscious IT companies to grow profitably abroad, and this important argument will be extensively discussed below. 5 But let it already be said here that since Norway is not the only Nordic exception to industrial success, there might be something to be learned from oil-free Denmark -a rich, small nation with a large IT sector and a comparatively small own production. Clearly Denmark and Norway have used IT in various ways and profited from this, the results of which may be found in general economic growth figures and not so much in IT industry statistics.
The focus in this discussion will be on the IT industry, i.e. the industrial and research-based part of the IT sector, arguably the best way to gain insight into the Norwegian national IT competence and its competitiveness. The following chapter is divided into five parts. First, the current situation is discussed, leading to a discussion of the historic development of the Norwegian IT industry, with emphasis on understanding the situation at the beginning of the 1970s. Then the development during the troubled 1970s and 1980s is discussed in two parts, before the ensuing changes of the IT industry are analysed. Finally, at the end, there will be a discussion of the long-term implications of this.
Large user, small producer (1970-2005)
The four Nordic countries are very similar in terms of population, economic structure and history. Sweden, with around nine million inhabitants, is roughly twice as large as each of the other three nations, and Finland -with its later start as an independent nation and its different language -is the odd nation out. But by and large the four are quite equal, and among these one has to be the worst IT performer in terms of industrial performance. That place belongs to
Norway.
The gross turnover in the ICT sector of these four nations is remarkably similar, as is underlined
by Table 1 below where absolute turnover is corrected by population size. While Norway has the smallest turnover in absolute terms, Norway is also the least populated nation of the four, and the small differences between Norway and Denmark and Finland may be explained by those differences. Sweden, with a global player in telecommunications along with a thriving Internet business up until 2000, was the biggest of the four. Finland was industrialized later than the other three nations, and the table more than underlines that Finland has caught up and is well able to compete.
[ By and large Table 1 introducing so-called modularity and has been used extensively for regulatory purposes. 11 The two men behind the language were professors at the University of Oslo, and one of them had his background at the National Defence Research Establishment. Simula never became a commercial success, but was a technical breakthrough for a way of programming. It underlines ambitions and competence in the Norwegian IT sector, present for several decades. It also makes the question of why Norway has not achieved more export success very relevant.
The remarkable differences between the Nordic countries come through when their indigenous ICT production is compared. Denmark comes across through these numbers as not up to Sweden and Finland's standard, but that should be seen against the background of Denmark's commercial success being larger than these numbers imply. While the numerical value of Norwegian exports of ICT goods is almost equal to that of ICT production, the Danish exports are almost twice the size of its production.
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That difference may be accounted for by re-exports and export-sales of software and services. Norway's strongest national asset may have been its broad competence in radio communications.
While Norway may have been a typical industrial country with strong interest in radio receivers that became the foundation of the modern consumer electronics industry, Norway had large merchant-and fishing-fleets purchasing communication equipment since the 1910s. In the interwar years this demand was met by an array of research-intensive small operationsElektrisk Bureau, STK, the Norwegian Marconi-company, the Norwegian Telefunken-company and some wholly Norwegian companies -making radio equipment. 16 While World War II and ensuing developments to some extent changed the fortunes of this industrial segment, it was important until the 1970s when the process of introducing satellite-communication began.
Norway have had a strong national and Government-funded commitment to space research for meteorological and telecommunication purposes, 17 and the company Nera -a wholly Norwegian continuation of Norwegian Telefunken -became the main Norwegian operator in satellitetelephony, being the heir to the old maritime radio industry.
Equally important was the change in Nera's fortunes just after World War II and its inclusion into national policy. Through allied wartime research, Norwegian engineers had been involved in large radar projects. 18 When this competence was continued within the 1946 creation NDRE (National Defence Research Establishment), collaboration with Nera was soon established. The knowledge from military radar projects was transformed to military and civilian radio-link technology, radio-links being wireless radio-transmission of telecommunications and an alternative to cable not least in a mountain-rich country like Norway. 19 Nera became a medium Tandberg was in all respects the last of these radio makers. 20 In 1972 Tandberg was among the three largest electronics makers in Norway, with a healthy export of tape recorders and stereo equipment and a growth-policy in colour televisions and a research program in computers.
Tandberg was a small "Philips" -the Dutch giant -and a source of national pride.
The last of the main Norwegian companies of the period that must be mentioned is Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk, the state owned weapons-manufacturer that since the late 1950s had been upgraded to become a maker of advanced rockets and command and control systems as well as other products for various automation purposes. 21 Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk worked in tandem with some of the above-mentioned public research institutions, but the main provider of new products was the NDRE, an increasingly independent promoter of new technology on the Norwegian research policy scene. 22 Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk was involved in a host of new technological activities reaching beyond IT, but there was a strong digital technological approach leading to signal-processing and systems technologies. Overall, the development of the Norwegian IT industry until 1973 may be described as an amalgamation between private enterprise and public research policy, with public research policy playing an increasingly important role. 27 Up until around 1960 and the impact of the debate on economic growth, the Norwegian IT policy rested on research policy. The industrial policy of Norway -which since 1945 had been quite interventionist -did not really concern the electronics industry. However, due to a number of developments, not least the discovery of the "residual" and the impact of technology on economic growth, electronics suddenly had center stage of industrial policy. 28 The modernisation of state owned Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk, and the start of AME, as well as Governmental finance for development projects done by Norsk Data, Simrad and other companies were part of this policy change. television production than the Japanese. 32 Skogvold was an expert on automation and had visited several Japanese plants. But Skogvold also argued that the Japanese worked harder and were more disciplined than the Tandberg employees.
And here was the problem: Tandberg was a model enterprise, famous for its remarkable industrial relations, which had been conscientiously nurtured since the 1940s by founder and CEO until 1974, Vebjørn Tandberg. Sackings and downsizing were out of the question, and ever since the company had introduced new products like the tape recorder in the early 1950s, new products were seen as both replacements for products with saturated markets and tools for growth. In the 1970s Tandberg was to grow with colour televisions (Tandberg was the second foreign firm to produce colour televisions in Great Britain in the 1970s, after Sony). 33 In the 1980s, when Tandberg perceived the colour television market to be saturated, Tandberg have any old electronics products in its portfolio, and the 1976 cornerstone plan made much more sense for this defence-centred company than it did for Tandberg. Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk purchased a couple of troubled Norwegian electronics companies and was given new equity to do so by its owner, the state. Particularly noteworthy among these takeovers was Kongsberg's acquition of Norcontrol -a ship automation company founded in 1965. 35 Elektrisk Bureau, the large maker of telecom equipment, also experienced rapidly changing technology and was able to shed parts of the workforce as production became more automated. Simrad, like Tandberg, was challenged by Japanese competition. 37 Simrad, a producer of small hydro-acoustic equipment to fit all kinds of vessels everywhere, was a global innovator in a To what extent had the "system" of productive interaction changed for the Norwegian IT industry during the 1970s? In one respect, the coming of activist policies of the 1960s had progressed into a very interventionist stance in the mid-1970s that was gone by 1978. The growing interdependencies between research institutions and the Governmental infrastructure of industrial finance was still in place, but the two companies formed in the 1960s to play important roles for the whole electronics industry -AME (integrated circuits) and Norsk Data (minicomputers) -functioned more or less as independent companies and did not play important roles in significant national networks. The most internationalized companies, Tandberg and Simrad, were hit hard by the new global competition and Tandberg ceased to exist, as did its mass market products. Simrad changed a great deal, from a family owned mass market operator to a stock-listed company selling complex technology for much higher prices.
Two new changes were underway at the end of the 1970s, however, that were profound new developments to the whole after-war period. The first was Governmental promotion of the stock exchange as an alternative to industrial policy and state controlled funding, something which underlined the change of atmosphere and, of course, reflected liberal attitudes found in several western countries at the time, not least Great Britain and USA. The second change followed in the same ideological path, namely a gradual shift to a new purchasing policy on the part of the state. The Norwegian public sector was never a totally nationalistic purchaser of goods, reflecting strong liberal values. 38 But the 1980s certainly changed the tide to a liberal inclination. Norwegian scientist as its GSM-system, Simonsen Elektro, Elektrisk Bureau/ABB and a Norwegian research organisation tried to develop a coordinated system of products to compete internationally. Problems at Simonsen Elektro, and the effects of the ABB-merger, led to the termination of the project, however, and Norway did not become a GSM-contender.
Revolutionary change, part II
The situation around 1990 for Norwegian mobile telephony may be compared to the situation following Tandberg's bankruptcy. 45 Mass market opportunities for mobile telephony and colour televisions were not exploited by Norwegians. The two situations were very different, but in some respects they may both have reflected a lack of managerial strength. Tandberg's managerial strength was pulverized through the drawn out process of fighting against the market, and the new owners of Tandberg after the bankruptcy saw the television challenge as too bigwhich it probably was for people without industry experience. 46 In mobile telephony there was no company that could take the lead. There was an abundance of technical competence in companies and research institutions to support a Norwegian entry into mobile telephony around 1990. But entry demanded entrepreneurship and financial commitment of a kind that was harder to find.
Simonsen Elektro was a natural candidate because of its market positions (Simonsen made highly regarded quality-phones), but the increased international competition in the NMTbusiness added to the particular Norwegian economic downturn at the end of the 1980s made an effort difficult. CEO and part owner Simonsen, who had the experience and competence needed for such an effort, was almost into his eighties and ended up selling the company. The comparison between Norway and Finland at the inception of GSM technology is instructive.
Both countries possessed similar competences in relevant fields, but Nokia was financially more powerful, had a broader competence base than Simonsen, and was much better commercially positioned within NMT than Simonsen. 47 The other company that could have played such a role in Norway, Elektrisk Bureau/ABB Norway, continued its effort for some time, but chose in 1990
to sell its Telecom business to Ericsson, creating Ericsson Norway. Perhaps there was some Swedish coordination on the part of ABB/Ericsson getting rid of a possible Norwegian contender, but in 1990
Ericsson had yet to formulate a strong strategy for GSM growth. 48 Following the fall in oil prices, the early 1990s was a period of economic problems in Norway.
It was a period of consolidation, and no company consolidated more than ABB Norway, the successor to Elektrisk Bureau: It reorganized its electricity business, sold its telecom business and went full-throttle into petroleum-related activities. 49 Much activity in Norway has since the 1970s gone in the petroleum-direction, crowding out other kinds of investments. ABB Norway proved to be a huge success in the 1990s, proving that getting rid of telecom and concentrating on oil-related activities was hardly the wrong decision. STK/Alcatel did try to pick up the pieces,
i.e. continue state-supported research programs, after Simonsen etc. gave up, but the effort did not get French backing. 50 To cut a long story short, in Norway at the time investors feared the kind of effort that going for mass markets would entail. Why go into risky business in what was a high-cost nation when there were plenty of investment opportunities in the sector that made
Norway such a high-cost location, namely oil, the attractive place to be even if price and activities had fallen since 1986? Why, indeed, go for telecom where no national purchases could be taken for granted?
The fall in oil-prices hit the remaining big IT companies of Norway hard. 51 According to figure 1 the only real downturn in terms of reduction of employment after 1972 is found after 1988.
While the 50 percent fall in employment from 1987 to 1992 also reflects the international downturn in the beginning of the 1990s, most of this negative trend must be seen as closely related to the problems in the Norwegian economy. Elektrisk Bureau and STK changed fairly gradually and according to changes in the public procurement policies, but some companies met their problems in a more abrupt and damaging way.
The first of the companies to face liquidation in 1987 was Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk, the state owned weapons-manufacturer that had been operative since 1814. The official investigation following its liquidation revealed a company that for many years had not fulfilled its budgets and had filled its financial needs directly from the Government, justified by a continuous process of investing in new and exciting technological areas. 52 What happened -stated more crudely -was 
Slow growth, small companies (1991-2006)
For the Norwegian economy, the years between 1987 and 1993 were very problematic. The fall in the oil prices hit the general level of activity of the Norwegian economy, which, when the international downturn following the Gulf war took effect, transformed itself into a full-blown property and banking crisis. On another level the political milieu in Norway finally realized that most of the high income from oil and gas had to be kept outside the Norwegian economy, so the period from around 1990 until today has been characterized by fairly steady development and a decent economic climate, not altogether bad for an internationally competitive industry.
To some degree "oil as a problem" was displaced by "oil as a solution", as some of the more successful Norwegian IT companies found a profitable market in the Norwegian oil industry.
Simrad was a forerunner here, and in addition to its products for dynamic position systems for seabed mapping by hydro-acoustics were made. 55 Many of the new IT products followed in the wake of the so called "Deals for technology", a Government-induced system after 1978 that gave oil companies goodwill in the process of handling out new concession for oilfields if they purchased Norwegian technology. 56 Some of the deals made between Norwegian companies and oil companies were not about oil related activities at all, and Norsk Data was a huge benefactor.
But some new products were developed in response to this new source of demand, and the full effect of this influx of fresh research money is hard to grasp in all its complexity.
This new policy reflected the character of the changes in economic policy of the late 1970s.
Gone were the days when the Government directly supported companies like Tandberg. That was dangerous for the Government when Tandberg failed. Gone were the days (they were never many) when large contracts given by the Government directly supported companies. That could also be dangerous for the Government. But "rigged" markets, the political construction of new networks between foreign oil companies and Norwegian technology-providers, giving the oil companies benefits later, was for some years after 1978 a viable alternative. Norway most certainly did not convert to anything like pure and principled liberalism in the late 1970s, and the limited nature of these shifts in policy may have contributed to the lack of understanding of the political changes on the part of Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk's leadership.
The companies benefiting the most in various ways from the oil economy may have been the successors of Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk. First, the maker of underwater production systems (and a firm whose products and technologies spanned much more than IT), Kongsberg Offshore Systems/FMC experienced a commercial breakthrough when underwater production systems by and large came to replace large platforms. 57 Kongsberg Gruppen, the defence-products company and the real successor to Kongsberg Våpenfabrikk, adapted to the changing geopolitical climate after 1990 with a series of acquisitions of companies in maritime electronics, including Norcontrol, previously under the Kongsberg umbrella. The large and important purchase was Kongsberg's unfriendly takeover of Simrad in 1996, and Simrad became the cornerstone in Kongsberg Maritime, which in addition to Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace was one of the two significant parts of Kongsberg Gruppen. Kongsberg Maritime had a range of offshore customers, but oil related activities were the significant market for this new entity. 58 It is difficult to quantify the positive role of oil for the IT industry of the 1990s. For Kongsberg
Maritime it played a significant role as a market for the company. For Kongsberg Offshore System and ABB's oil business IT was an integral part of larger technical systems and therefore important for the development of new and complex products. For the telecommunications sector developing an infrastructure for the Norwegian petroleum sector has been an ongoing task covering several technological phases and different actors. 59 The single most compelling illustration of oil's helpful role may just be that the largest IT company of Norway, Kongsberg
Gruppen, is the one company where oil clearly has meant the most. This is also the one company 
